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A Triangular Contest of Power on the
Tea-Horse Road:
The Tang Dynasty, Tibetan Empire, and
the Nanzhao Kingdom
Lejiu Sun (Wake Forest University)
Introduction
The Tea-Horse Road hardly makes it into the maps of
the Silk Road. When it does, it is often shown as a road connecting the Indian Ocean with the Chinese empire. This paper
seeks to contribute to the current scholarly conversation by
examining how this road functioned as a regional network.
Focusing on the period from the seventh to the ninth centuries,
the paper explores how the Tea-Horse Trade shaped and was
shaped by the relationships among the Tang dynasty, Nanzhao
kingdom, and the Tibetan Empire which governed the regions of modern-day Yunnan, Sichuan, and Tibet. These states
formed a triangular relationship of contest and confrontation,
each hatching strategies to capitalize on the trade along the TeaHorse Road and to strengthen their standing in comparison to
the other two competitors.
Before 755
Before 755, an unbalanced triangular contest of power
appeared on the Tea-Horse Road. The Tang (618-907), founded by Li Yuan (the Emperor Gaozu), and the Tibetan Empire
(634-842), founded by King Songtsen Gampo, had matching
military strengths and flourished and declined roughly at the
same pace.Nanzhao, however, was a newcomer to the competition, emerging as an independent state only in 738. During
Penn History Review

99

A Triangular Contest of Power on
the Tea-Horse Road

the first century and a half of their existence, the Tang dynasty
and the Tibetan Empire formed an alliance through the marriages of two Tang princesses to Tibetan Kings. This was a
diplomatic strategy known as Heqin (和亲), which had been
practiced by Chinese courts since the Han dynasty (206 BCE220 CE). Both powers were leading players on the Tea-Horse
Road. The first Heqin marriage happened in 641, when Princess Wencheng of Tang married King Songtsen Gampo of the
Tibetan Empire. This marriage ushered in an era of free trade
between the two states by allowing Tibetan merchants to sell
their herds and handcrafts in exchange for Chinese silk, ironware, and especially, tea. The rise of tea drinking as a popular
custom among Tibetan elite and Buddhist monks shortly after
its introduction from Tang China was partially due to the belief
that tea had the property to eliminate toxins in dairy and barley,
the staple Tibetan diet. According to Chinese sources dated to
the Ming period, the Tibetans admired tea, for tea was the only
food that healed diseases and allergy caused by eating dairy
products. Moreover, Tibetans, as most nomadic people, consumed a lot of cheese, andtea could balance the monotonous
diet and prevent Tibetans from getting sick easily.1 Considering
both benefits, Tibetan doctors defined tea as medicine, and
consequently, tea-drinking culture began to prevail among the
Tibetan upper class and Buddhists.2 Tea later became the top
product traded on the Tea-Horse Road.
In 710, Princess Jincheng’s marriage with King Me
Agtsom elevated the relationship between the Tibetan Empire and Tang to an “Uncle-Nephew” level. According to the
Tibetan classic A Scholar’s Feast, Tibetan King Trisong Detsen
claimed himself to be the son of prince Jincheng and called Han
Chinese male adults “uncles” when he was one year old.3 This
story, despite its great exaggeration of King Trisong Detsen’s
intelligence, hinted that after the Heqin of Prince Jincheng, the
Tibetan Empire respected the Tang as a nephew would to an
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uncle.

This close relationship culminated in a governmentcontrolled horse and tea exchange. In 729, at the request of the
Tibetan Empire, the two states began a routinized governmentled horse and tea exchange through a mechanism known as the
“tea-horse trade market’’ (茶马互市 Cha ma hu shi). Through
this exchange, the volume of trade was negotiated and confirmed equally by both Tang and Tibetan governments. According to The New Book of Tang (dating to the 11th century), the
Tibetan Empire requested that they be permitted to present
horses as tributes to the Tang at Mount Chilin in present day
Riyue Lake, Qinghai, and also requested to open markets for
trade at Mount Gansong, in present day Songpan, Sichuan. As
their messages reached the Tang court, the Tang prime minister
Pei Guangting (裴光庭) weighed in on the proposals. Because
Mount Gansong was near the Chinese central plains, having Tibetans stationed there for trade would pose a potential security
threat; Pei suggested setting the exchange at Chilin, which was
approved by Emperor Xuanzong. The emperor then commanded Li Quan -- the General of Imperial Insignia (金吾将
军李佺) -- to supervise the erection of a stone stele at Chilin to
mark the border between the two empires. The emperor further
summoned Zhang Shougui (张守珪), General Li Xiaoyi (李孝
逸), and the Tibetan envoy Khu Mangpoje (莽布支) to carry
his edict to Jiannan and Hexi Circuits that governed the Tang
domains bordering with Tibet, which says: “Henceforth our
two countries shall remain in harmony and peace. There should
be no aggression and violence towards each other.”4
In response to this agreement, both states established
institutions which actively prepared for the tea-horse exchange.
The Tibetan Empire recruited a group of five Han merchants —
the Han di wu cha shang (汉地五茶商 “Five Chinese Tea Traders”) who specialized in conducting the tea-horse trade.5 The
“Five Chinese Tea Traders” conducted state-oriented trade to
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make sure the revenue from tea-horse exchanges was funneled
back to the Tibetan government and facilitated the cultural
exchange between the Tibetan Empire and Tang.
The Tang also established the Institute for Tea-Horse
Exchange (茶马交换所 Cha ma jiao huan suo) in Anduo (安
多) as an official market. A government-led trading system on
the Sichuan-Tibet road emerged, and the tea-horse trade that
passed through it seemed unstoppable. Since 731, each time the
border markets were opened, both the Tang and Tibetan Empire would send a governor to take charge of the shipment of
their goods to the designated market. The goods were restricted
to just tea and horses. Such a win-win exchange took place no
less than 191 times in 116 years (from 731 to 846). During this
time Tang sent its officers to Tibet 66 times, while Tibet sent
its ambassadors to the Tang 125 times. By 731, the Tibetan
government had imported so much tea through the Tea-Horse
Exchange Markets that tea became affordable for the common
Tibetans. From then on it gradually became an indispensable
part of the Tibetan diet (see Map 1 below).6
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Map One: the Chuan (Sichuan)-Tibet Road
The eruption of tensions towards the mid-eighth century
between Tang and the Tibetan empire interfered with their trade,
and the nascent Nanzhao Kingdom was drawn into the conflict,
resulting in the formation of an unbalanced triangular power relation
in the region. In 737, a war broke out between Tang and the Tibetan
empire. While Tang was still able to import horses from its stud-farms
in Longyou, the Tibetan empire needed to find another tea-producing
country to substitute for Tang.7
In 750, Nanzhao, formerly known as Mengsheman (蒙舍
蛮), a loose cluster of tribes that collectively sent tribute to the Tang
court, was unified by King Piluoge (阁罗凤) in 649. No longer
willing to suffer the brutal governance by Zhang Qiantuo (张虔
陀), the Tang prefecture in Yunnan rebelled. King Geluofeng, who
led this rebellion, killed Zhang Qiantuo.8 When the Tang general
Xian Yuzhongtong (鲜于仲通) led an attack on Nanzhao, Nanzhao
turned to ally with the Tibetan Empire.9 Nanzhao was a traditional
tea-producing country, where tea bushes were found throughout the
mountains within the limits of Yinsheng city (银生城). The locals
did not develop an industry of growing and preparing tea for remote
markets, but harvested it for their own consumption. They brewed
and drank the tea with Sichuan pepper, ginger, and cinnamon.10
Noticing this potential tea-provider, the Tibetan Empire generously
sent 600,000 soldiers to assist Nanzhao, won the battle against the
Tang, and granted Nanzhao the title “brother-like state,” the name
“Eastern Emperor” and a golden seal to the King of Nanzhao.11
In order to import tea from Nanzhao, the Tibetan empire
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opened the trade route from Dali in Nanzhao to Lhasa in
Tibet. The Tibetan empire also established the Shenzhou
Commandery (Iron Bridge Commandery) at the border to
take control of the tea export in Nanzhao. The Shenzhou
Iron Bridge was located at present day Ta Cheng, which had
previously been a military station between the Tibetan Empire
and Nanzhao. In 703, the Tibetan king built the Shenzhou Iron
Bridge across the Jinsha River (金沙江, the river on the border
between Nanzhao and the Tibetan Empire). After Nanzhao
betrayed Tang, the Tibetan Empire left its troops in the city of
Ta Cheng. As the war ended, two cities named as the Eastern
and Western Iron Bridge Cities (铁桥城 the city of iron bridge)
developed around this bridge, and these two cities functioned
as the trading ports between Nanzhao and the Tibetan Empire.
Noticing this economic benefit, the Tibetan Empire dispatched
troops and officers to establish the Shenzhou Commandery
in the Western Iron Bridge City.12 As a frontier juncture, the
Shenzhou Commandery held the barracks of Tibetan troops
who carried on the mission of protecting the Shenzhou Iron
Bridge, monitoring Tang and Nanzhao, and representing
the alliance between the Tibetan Empire and Nanzhao. As a
governmental institution, the Shenzhou Commandery served
as the gate on the Dian (modern day Yunnan)-Tibet Road
to collect heavy taxes from traders, maintain the safety of
international mercantile activities, and control exportation and
importation of tea in Nanzhao. The Shenzhou Commandery
symbolized the Tibetan Empire’s authoritarian control over
the Dian-Tibet trade route. Not capable of standing up to its
neighbor, Nanzhao was taken advantage of economically by the
Tibetan Empire.
However, even without the ability to control the trading
center in the Iron Bridge Cities, Nanzhao still benefited from
this Tibet-led trading system. With the help of the Tibetan
government, the Dian-Tibet trade route was systemized with
its center in the Iron Bridge cities. On this Dian-Chuan road,
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it was still Han Chinese merchants who transported tea, the main
goods, mostly from Yunnan, but sometimes from Sichuan, to Tibetan
towns and cities, sold them to Tibetan merchants. Reciprocally,
merchants returned with horses, herbs and other agricultural
products from Tibet for resale in major trading cities in Nanzhao,
such as Lijiang, Dali and Kunming.13 According to Manshu, Tibetan
merchants also frequently visited these cities to trade.14 Scattered
trading cities like Dali, Lijiang, Zhongdian, Deqin and Kunming
were connected by these traveling merchants. The sophisticated
trading network economically unified the Nanzhao Kingdom (See
Map 2). Some of the trading cities accumulated wealth, which would
support Nanzhao’s development after 755.

Map Two: the Dian-Tibet Road
The period before 755, therefore, can be seen as the age
of unbalanced triangular competition and confrontation on the
Tea-Horse Road. The first century and half witnessed similar
developments happening in both Tang and the Tibetan Empire.
Nanzhao acted as a vassal state of either the Tang or Tibetan Empire,
but also actively prepared for its own rise. None of the three states
fully dominated the trade; all had their gains and losses. Government
control, in the form of Tea-Horse Exchange policies or heavy
taxation, already appeared on the Tea-Horse Road, but this seems to
have primarily been driven by political reasons.
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After 755
From 755 to 866, the Tang and Tibetan Empires both
declined due to internal and external threats. This opened up an
opportunity for Nanzhao to grow. As state power became more
equally distributed among the three partners, each state shifted
their trading purpose from political game-play to economic
recovery. In 755, the An Lushan Rebellion devastated Tang’s
military and economy. Seizing the opportunity, the Tibetan
Empire, under the leadership of King Trisong Detsen, moved to
control the Longyou horse ranches, forcing the Tang to import
horses and borrow cavalry from its northern neighbor Uyghurs
at higher prices.15 Simultaneously, Nanzhao troops, under King
Geluofeng (阁罗凤), conquered the Juan perfection (巂州) of
Tang in its northwest.16 As a result, the Tang Court, desperately
in need of money, had to use the Tea-Horse Road trade to
enrich its treasury.
Starting in 782, Tang levied taxes on tea as well as
on lacquer, wood and bamboo, something it had never done
previously.17 The tax was set at one tenth of the value of the
goods.18 The tea tax effectively provided the Tang government
with a large financial fund, which could be deployed to
strengthen Tang’s national defense. The efficacy of this tax came
from the massive tea-trade between the Tibetan Empire and the
Tang government. Except for the years of wars between them,
the two empires continued to carry on their trade. By the year
781 (under the rule of Trisong Detsen), Tang, with declining
state power, valued the economic benefit from Tea-Horse Road
trade more than its political value.
Later in 835, at the eve of another war between Tang
and the Tibetan Empire, Tang rolled out the “Que cha” policy,
which was first proposed by Wang Ya, who became the first Que
Cha Shi (榷茶使 Superintendent of Tea Monopoly).19 Tang’s
Que Cha policy included prohibiting all private tea trade and
centralizing all processes of making tea - growing, picking, pan
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frying, sorting, packing and marketing - under state control.
The local government established state-run tea plantations,
abolished private-ownership of tea gardens, and enforced
moving private tea trees to state-run tea plantations.20 After
840, under the rule of Emperor Wu of Tang, officer Cui Gong
revised the Que Cha policy by adding taxes on tea merchants
passing through every prefecture. After that, tea smuggling
gradually increased, forcing the Tang to update the Que cha
policy by adding heavy penalties for tea smugglers. Private
traders who have dealt more than 300 jin of tea for three times,
or transported tea over long distances, would be sentenced to
death.21 This Que Cha policy brought the tea industry under
state monopoly. This enabled the Tang court to collect all
revenues from tea production, thereby supporting its treasury
on a larger scale. Another example could hint at the magnitude
of the profits reaped by the dynasty and the officials in charge
of its implementation. Several years after Wang Ya became the
Superintendent of Tea Monopoly, he was charged with bribery
and corruption. Soldiers and mobs stormed his estate and
found tens of thousands of treasures.22
From taxing this trade to monopolizing it, Tang devised
increasingly aggressive strategies to profit from the lucrative
Tea-Horse Road trade. To some degree, these policies sustained
Tang’s rule for decades, but, as do all expedient means, neither
tax nor the Que Cha policy fully saved Tang from collapsing.
They did, however, function as effective innovations that led to
the systemization of the Tea-Horse Road.
To its southwest, after 44 years allying with the
Tibetan empire, Nanzhao was powerful enough to break this
relationship. In 794, Tang ambassador Wei Gao (韦皋), after
trying in vain for five years to persuade Nanzhao to submit to
the Tang, secretly paid a visit to Nanzhao. Wei Gao presented
the letter from the Tang Emperor asking Yimouxun (异牟寻),
the King of Nanzhao, to return the golden seal to the Tibetan
Empire as a symbol of ending their alliance with Tibet.23
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Already harboring resentment against the Tibetan Empire, King
Yimouxun allied with the Tang and promptly occupied sixteen
major Tibetan cities.24 Among them were the Iron Bridge Cities
(铁桥城), where the Shenzhou Commandery was located.
Finally, in 795, when Nanzhao garrisoned in the Youbaluo
mountain in Xichuan (西川) and Tang stabilized its territory in
Xizhou (西州), the Dian-Chuan Road was finally opened as the
third official trade route in the Tea-Horse Road trade region,
linking Tang’s southwestern frontier region of Chuan in modern
day Sichuan province with Nanzhao’s major trading centers in
Dian (namely the modern day Yunnan province).25 See Map
3, The Dian-Chuan Tea-Horse Road, below. Occupying the
Shenzhou Commandery, the previous trading center of the
Tibetan Empire, Nanzhao controlled mercantile activities on
the road between Yunnan and Tibet.

Map Three: the Dian-Chuan Road
Meanwhile, during the period from 794 to 886,
Nanzhao maintained an overall peaceful relation with Tang,
sending 46 missions in total to the Tang court via the DianChuan Road for gift exchange. On one of these missions, King
Yimouxun of Nanzhao sent 60 horses as well as 100 Tibetan
war prisoners to the Tang court to strengthen the friendship.
In other years the gifts were diverse, including people (mainly
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slaves, prisoners of war, and artists), animals (mostly horses),
aromatics and herbs, ores, and other manufactures.26 This
relationship between Nanzhao and Tang was similar to the
Tibet-Tang alliance in the early 7th century, in which both
independent states peacefully exchanged their goods for political
reasons. Nevertheless, neither Tang nor Nanzhao maintained
gift-sending missions for economic purposes. For Nanzhao, the
peaceful relationship with Tang facilitated its trade on the DianChuan Road. For Tang, Nanzhao could check the expansion of
the Tibetan Empire and thereout protect its commercial center
in Sichuan.
During this period, the Tang and Tibetan empires,
suffering a decline in their respective powers, invented policies
to maintain their political influences on the Tea-Horse Road.
Some of these policies were proven effective and would be
borrowed by their successors in later period. For example,
the taxation on tea and the Que Cha policy invented by the
Tang for solving its desperate dilemma were later borrowed
by the Song (960-1279) for the same purpose when dealing
with Nanzhao’s successor state Dali over issues related to the
horse-salt exchange between them. Nanzhao, the weakest state
in the earlier period, had grown to be a major influence on the
Tea-Horse Road. Each state engaged this trade in a manner
calculated to reflect its self-understanding of its position in the
triangular international relationships. Yet, all three states sought
to gain economic benefit within this triangular contest and
confrontation on the Tea-Horse Road for economic reasons, in
contrast to the game-play before 755.
Conclusion
From the 7th to the 9th centuries, the triangular contest
among Tang, Nanzhao and the Tibetan empire gradually
intensified as each state sought to capitalize on the TeaHorse Road trade. Their main purpose of trade shifted from
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political domination to economic recovery. Their diplomatic
relationships, either peaceful or hostile, were reflected on the
Tea-Horse Road exchange among them in the form of trade
policies, institutions, and shifting road networks See Map 4).

Map Four: the Map of the Tea-Horse Road
The supply and demand relationship of tea and horse
also resulted in betrayals, invasions and treaties that affected
diplomacy. While concrete actions taken may have differed,
each partner to this contest sought the same goal: to strengthen
itself at the expense of its neighbors by shaping this trade in its
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favor.
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Notes
1 Accroding to a passage in the Yachayi (严茶议 Yan’s Comments on tea)
茶之为物，西戎吐蕃古今皆仰之，以其腥内之物，非茶不消，青稞
之热，非茶不解” cited from Wang Tingxiang 王廷相(Ming Dynasty)
Yan cha yi (严茶议》Yan’s Comments on tea);According to a passage in
the Mingshi (明史 History of the Ming Dynasty), “番人嗜乳酪，不得
茶，则困以病。故唐、宋以来，行以茶易马法，用制羌、戎，而明
制尤密。有官茶，有商茶，皆贮边易马。官茶间徵课钞，商茶输课
略如盐制。” Cited from Chang Qu张廷玉 (Ming dynasty), History of
Ming (明史 志第五十六食货四) History of Ming, shi huo zhi), juan 4,
accessed online on April 3, 2018 at https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapte
r=270027&remap=gb#p43.
2 Michael Freeman and Selena Ahmed, Tea Horse Road: China’s Ancient
Trade Road to Tibet, 2015.
3 See Bawo Zulachenwa 巴卧·祖拉陈哇 (author) and Huang Hao 黄
颢 (trans.), “Xianze xiyan zhaiyi (wu)“( 贤者喜宴》摘译(五) Translated
Excerpts from A Scholar’s Feast (5))) ( Xizang minzu xueyuan xuebao (
西藏民族学院学报 Journal of Xizang Minzu University (Philosophy and
Social Sciences Edition), 1981, no. 04: p. 53-70 and 82.
4 Xin Tangshu (新唐书 The New Book of Tang), compiled in 1044-1060
by Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修 and Song Qi 宋祁, juan p. 230.
http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/newtangsu/xts_230.htm.
5 Zangzu jianshi bianxiezu (藏族简史编写組 Brief history of Tibetan
writing group), “Zang Zu Jian Shi” (藏族简史 A Brief History of Tibet),
Xizang renming chubanshe (西藏人民出版社 the Tibet’s People’s Publishing House),1985, 83; Original text: “至赤松德赞时期, 藏族即以马匹
大量换取内地的茶叶, 茶马贸易开始发展起来。吐蕃为了加 强对茶
叶贸易 的管理，派专人负责经营汉藏茶叶贸易，称为 “汉地五茶商”
cite from Pawo Tsuglag Threngwa (1504-1566)《智者喜筵》A Scholar’s
Feast, pin p. 7.
6 Peng, Yujuan 彭玉娟, … Qiu, Jian 邱健, and Cang, Bang 昌邦,
“Chama gudao ji qi dui cha wnehua chuanbo de jiaohu yingxiang tanxi”
(茶马古道及其对茶文化传播的交互影响探析 the Ancient Tea-Horse
Road Development and Ins Reciprocal effect on the Tea Culture Communication). Guangxi Minzu daxue xuebao 广西民族大学学报 (哲
学社会科学版) Journal of Guangxi University For Nationalities), no.
05(2016):p. 35.
7Longyou is located northwest of Chang ‘an, in today’s Shaanxi and
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Gansu; Denis Twitchett, ed., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, Sui and T’ang
China, 589-906, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 569.
8 The Yunnan prefecture of Tang was located in the present-day Yunnan province of China, which includes Nanzhao during Zhang Qiantuo’s period.
9 Fang, Tie 方铁. “Nanzhao, tubo yu tangchao sanzhe jian de guanxi” (南诏、
吐蕃与唐朝三者间的关系 The relationship between nanzhao, tubo and tandynasty). Zhongguo zangxue (中国藏学 China Tibetology) 63,no.3 (2003): p. 44.
10 Manshu (蛮书 Book of Southern Barbarians, 868-873), by Fan Chuo, juan
7, photo-reproduced edition in Jingyin wenyuange siku quanshu (景印文淵閣
四庫全書 Complete Collection of the Four Treasures), vo. 464 (Taipei: Taiwan
shangwu yinshuguan, 1983-1986), p. 25.
11 Hans Bielenstein, Diplomacy and Trade in the Chinese World, 589-1276
(Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 260.
12 Feng, Zhi 冯智. “Tubo nanzhao shenzhou tieqia” (吐蕃南诏神州铁桥 The
Tibetan Empire, Nanzhao and the Shenzhou Iron Bridge). Xizang yanjiu (西
藏研究 Tibetan Studies), no. 02 (1992), http://www.tibet.cn/cn/cloud/xszqkk/
xzyj/1992/2/201710/t20171025_4604319.html.
13 Gu, Zhongyuan 谷中原 and Lu, Hui 鲁惠. “Xinan Diqu Chama Gudao
Lunlu” (西南地区茶马古道论略, Discussion on Tea-horse Ancient Road in
Southwest China) Chaye Tongxun (茶叶通讯 Tea Communication), no. 02
(2007), http://kns.cnki.net/kns/ViewPage/viewsave.aspx.
14 Manshu, juan 2, p. 7.
15 Denis Twitchett, ed., “Cambridge History of China,” p. 569.
16 Fang, Tie 方铁. “Nanzhao, tubo yu tangchao sanzhe jian de guanxi,” p. 44.
17 Kuang, Lasheng 况腊生, Qianxi songdai chama maoyi zhidu （浅析宋代
茶马贸易制度 A brief analysis of tea and horse trade system in Song dynasty),
Lanzhou Xuekan (兰州学刊 Lanzhou Academic Journal)176, no. 05 (2008): p.
147.
18 See Jiu tangshu (舊唐書 Old Book of Tang), compiled by Liu Xu 劉昫
(888–947), juan 12, digitized
edition, accessed online on April 2, 2019, at
https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=925753&remap=gb.
19 See Jiu tangshu, juan 169, accessed online on April 2, 2019, at https://ctext.
org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=925753&remap=gb.
20 Zhang, Yongguo 张永国. “ Chama gudao yu chama maoyi de lishi yu jiazhi”
(茶马古道与茶马贸易的历史与价值 The history and value of the Tea-Horse
Road and Tea-Horse Trade). Xizang daxue xuebao (西藏大学学报(汉文版
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Journal of Tibetan University) 21, no.2 (2006), p. 34-40; Sun Hongsheng
孙洪生, “Tangdai quecha shulun” (唐代榷茶述论 On the Que Cha Policy
in the Tang Dynasty), Nongye kaogu (农业考古 Agricultural Archeology), no. 4 (1997): p. 314.
21 1 jin in the Tang equals to about 680 grams today; See Xin tangshu (新
唐書 New Book of Tang), compiled by Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修 (1007–1072)
and Song Qi 宋祁 (998-1061), juan 54, digitized edition, accessed online
on April 5, 2019, athttps://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/%E6%96%B0%E5
%94%90%E6%9B%B8/%E5%8D%B7054
22 See Jiu tangshu, juan p. 169.
23 Hu, Yantao 胡岩涛, “Tangchao, tubo, nanzhao xinan zhanshi yu changan zhanlue fangyu” (唐朝、吐蕃、南 西南战事与长安战略防御——
以代宗、德宗朝为中心 Tang Dynasty, Tubo, Nanzhao Southwest War
and Chang’an Strategic Defense). Xizang Mingzu Daxue Xuebao(西藏
民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版) Journal of Xizang Minzu University
(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)) 39, no. 02 (March 2018): p. 34.
24 Fang, Tie 方铁, “Nanzhao, tubo yu tangchao sanzhe jian de guanxi,” p.
46.
25 Hu, Yantao 胡岩涛, “Tangchao, tubo, nanzhao xinan zhanshi yu changan zhanlue fangyu,” p. 36.
26 Bielenstein, Diplomacy and Trade in the Chinese World, p. 273.
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